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Abstract: What individuates the speech act of prediction? The stan-
dard view is that prediction is individuated by the fact that it is the
unique speech act that requires future-directed content. We argue
against this view and two successor views. We then lay out several
other potential strategies for individuating prediction, including the
sort of view we favor. We suggest that prediction is individuated nor-
matively and has a special connection to the epistemic standards of
expectation. In the process, we advocate some constraints that we
think a good theory of prediction should respect.
 Introduction
The category of assertives is a broad and important category of speech
acts. The category’s namesake, the speech act of assertion, has received the
lion’s share of attention in recent years. Debates about assertion’s nature
and norms have loomed large in both the philosophy of language and epis-
temology (e.g. Geach , Williamson : ch. , Turri , Benton
, the essays in Brown & Cappelen , and Turri b). But asser-
tion isn’t the only interesting and important assertive that has received at-
tention in the literature recently. For example, recent work focuses on the
speech acts of predicting and guaranteeing (Benton , Kelp , Turri
a). And earlier work on assertion itself has often relied on important
assumptions about assertion’s relationship to other assertives, again fo-

cusing on prediction and guaranteeing (e.g. Weiner  and Turri ,
respectively).
The category of assertives includes guessing, conjecturing, hedged as-
serting, flat-out asserting, swearing and guaranteeing, among others. Ac-
cording to the standard view (Searle , pp. –), at least two impor-
tant features bind these together into a useful genus. First, their illocution-
ary point is to commit the speaker, to some degree, to the truth of some
claim. Second, they have a word-to-world direction of fit, in that their
purpose is to represent the way the world is. But what individuates the
species of assertives within the broader genus? In particular, what might
individuate prediction specifically, such that a speech act is a prediction
rather than a guess or a flat-out assertion?
One might think that the very idea that there is a speech act of pre-
diction distinct from (say) flat-out assertion requires argument. Here are
some reasons to think there is a distinct speech act of prediction, even
though one can predict by asserting: first, in some conversational con-
texts, it is clear to the participants that an outright declarative utterance
‘P’ is not a flat-out assertion, but rather a prediction. For example, with
the election race very tight, when one is asked, ‘Whom do you predict will
win the next election?’, one’s outright utterance ‘Obama will win’ plau-
More precisely, the point is to commit the speaker either to the truth of some claim,
or to the untruth of some claim. Denial is also an assertive, the twin of assertion, but it
commits the speaker to the untruth of the claim denied. We can set this complication
aside.
It might be thought that, as a corollary of the two distinguishing features just men-
tioned, by performing an assertive speech act, one thereby expresses some degree of be-
lief, or at least implies that one believes to some degree that the relevant proposition is
true (compare what Searle says at , pp. – in light of , p. ). But this doesn’t
seem essential, since guessing that P does not, even by default, express or imply that the
guesser believes, even to some degree, that P is true. Even Searle seems to recognize
this when he remarks, ‘The degree of belief and commitment may approach or even reach
zero’ (, p. , emphasis added). This is reflected in the fact that the following isn’t
Moore-paradoxical: ‘I’m not the least bit confident that P is true, but still, my guess is
that P’.

sibly merely predicts rather than (outright) asserts; likewise, were one
prompted in such a context with ‘Whom would you say will win?’, ‘Whom
do you expect will win?, or (perhaps most commonly) ‘Whom do you think
will win?’, by answering ‘Obama’ one will naturally be regarded as merely
predicting rather than outright asserting that Obama will win. One of the
tell-tale signs of this is that in such a case, by uttering ‘P’, the speaker
does not represent herself as knowing P, and perhaps in some contexts
does not even represent herself as outright believing P. Second, in such
a case it will often seem strange for the conversational participants to re-
spond to such utterances with questions like ‘How do you know?’, since it
is clear to those involved that the speaker is merely predicting rather than
asserting.
Thus before beginning in earnest, we’d like to flag a simplifying device.
It’s not uncommon to perform one speech act by performing another, as
when one makes a request by asking a question (as with ‘Can you pass the
salt?’), or swears to the truth of something by asserting it (as with sworn
testimony). And arguably one can perform speech acts non-verbally too,
at least once the speech act has been established in the community. We
don’t deny that one can predict by guessing or even flat-out asserting; nor
do we deny that one can predict non-verbally. But we do think it’s best
to focus our investigation here on cases of direct, verbal prediction—that
is, on cases where one predicts that P verbally, but doesn’t do so by guess-
ing that P or asserting that P (e.g. by the schema ‘I predict that P’). This
simplifies the task of discerning what, if anything, constitutes the speech
act of prediction. Nuances involving indirect or nonverbal prediction can
then be added as the need or interest arises.
Such occasions will be likely be ones in which the speaker somehow signals (perhaps
through intonation or hesitancy, etc.) that she is less confident. But in cases without
such signals, an outright utterance (even if a mere prediction) will tend to represent the
speaker as believing, as is suggested by the fact that while ‘How do you know?’ will seem
out of place, ‘Why do you think that?’ or ‘Why do you believe that?’ will be acceptable
questions or challenges. (Thanks to an anonymous referee here.)

 The iffy view
Let’s begin with what is, by an overwhelming margin, the most common
answer we encounter to our question. When we ask, ‘What individuates
prediction within the class of assertives?’, the first response tends to be,
‘Why, futurity, of course!’ More specifically, the view is that the speech act
of prediction is individuated by the fact that it alone must have a future-
directed content: a speech-act is a prediction if and only if it must have
future-direct content. Because this view says that the speech act of pre-
diction is individuated by future-directed content, we’ll call it the iffy view
of predictions. Searle appears to advocate the iffy view when he writes,
The differences, for example, between a report and a predic-
tion involve the fact that a prediction must be about the future
whereas a report can be about the past or present. (, p. )
The iffy view gains intuitive support from etymology. Our word ‘predict’
derives from the Latin praedicere, which is composed of the prefix prae-,
which means ‘before’, and dicere, which means ‘say’. Thus ‘predict’ ar-
guably means ‘say before’ (or ‘foretell’), and ‘say before’ is most plausibly
interpreted as ‘say before it happens’. It’s a benefit of the iffy view that it
can uphold this etymological desideratum, as we might call it, in this way.
A minor adjustment to the iffy view is required to handle predictions
about the future made in the simple present tense. The historical present
We say ‘future-directed’ rather than ‘future-tensed,’ because, first, predictions can
be made without using the future tense (e.g. ‘I am going to be at your party’, which
uses the present progressive). And second, according to many linguists, many languages
(including English) do not even have a future tense; yet it still seems plausible to say that
predictions can be made in such languages. We’ll also assume that the iffy view holds
that the future-directed contents must also be contingent.
Another iffy view builds the future-directedness into the speaker’s intention to com-
municate something about (what the speaker takes to be) the future; the iffy views can-
vassed later in the main text also could be construed at the level of speaker intention.
Such a view would handle what seems right about a subject who wrongly thinks it is
 and predicts that P about . But such intentionally iffy approaches fall prey to
some of the obvious counterexamples to be discussed below.

is typically characterized as the use of the present tense when describing
past events. For example, when explaining the demise of the dinosaurs
to a group of children, we could say, ‘It’s sixty-five million years ago. It
seems like just another day to the enormous reptiles roaming the land.
But little do they know that disaster is about to strike, in the form of a
giant meteor.’ A similar device, what we might call the antecedent present,
allows us to use the simple present tense to describe future events. For ex-
ample, in the early twenty-first century, a climatologist might describe the
likely effects of global warming in the late twenty-first century by saying,
‘The polar caps completely melt, the ocean level rises, and coastal cities
worldwide are devastated.’ To take another example, if asked to predict
the outcome of next week’s playoff series between Boston and Vancouver,
you could say, ‘Boston wins the series in five games,’ and this would count
as a prediction that Boston will win the series in five games. To accom-
modate the antecedent present, the iffy view should be adjusted to read:
predictions are individuated by requiring future-directed content, even if
this content isn’t expressed in a distinctively future-tensed way.
But even when understood in the most plausible way, the iffy view
faces a serious problem: it excludes many paradigm cases of prediction.
Theories and theoreticians predict things, and sometimes they predict
things that have happened long ago. Big Bang Theory and its proponents
predict that the early universe was extremely hot, that galaxies used to be
much closer together, and much else besides about the past, even unto its
utmost reaches. Or to take a more mundane case, suppose we all know
that the ball game is over and has a winner. We can still sensibly ask you,
‘Whom do you predict won the game?’, and you could sensibly answer, ‘I
predict that Boston won.’ Future-directed content is not essential to pre-
Physicists really do talk this way. Google searches reveal the following examples: ‘If
we trace the rate of expansion and extrapolate in time, we predict that the uni-verse in
the past was smaller than the universe of today’; and ‘Cosmologists predict that the early
Universe was full of small galaxies which led short and violent lives.’

diction. The iffy view is false.
 The modified iffy view
A natural response to this last objection begins by revisiting the etymo-
logical desideratum. Earlier we were happy to understand ‘predict’ as
meaning ‘say before’. But say before what? We assumed that it meant
say before it (the predicted event) happens. But as we just saw, this is un-
acceptable because it rules out paradigm cases of predictions about past
events. Another interpretation of ‘say before’ is that predictions pertain
to the predictor’s future evidential situation. On this view, ‘I predict that
Boston won’ is elliptical for something like ‘I predict that we’ll discover
that Boston won’, and ‘I predict that the early universe was extremely hot’
is elliptical for something like ‘I predict that we’ll find evidence best ex-
plained by the hypothesis that the early universe was extremely hot’. In
short, ‘say before’ amounts to ‘say before you learn’. Call this the modified
iffy view. According to the modified iffy view, when properly understood,
the predictions we adduced as counterexamples to the iffy view do have
future-directed contents: they are about what the predictor will learn in
the future about the truth of the proposition in question. Understood this
way, they are not counterexamples to the modified iffy view.
The primary problem with the modified iffy view is that it mischar-
acterizes what our predictions are about. When we make the prediction,
‘Boston will win the series in five games,’ it doesn’t seem to us that we’re
making a prediction about what we’ll learn about the outcome of the se-
ries. Rather, it seems to us that the truth of our prediction depends solely
on the outcome of the series, not what we learn about the series. Con-
sider also this example. Late in life, Edwin Hubble lobbied for the Nobel
We intend ‘learn’ to be understood flexibly. Variations on this proposal could fea-
ture ‘know’, ‘discover’, ‘acquire good evidence’, etc. These details won’t figure into our
evaluation of the view, so we note them here briefly, only to set them aside.

Prize Committee to make work in astronomy eligible for the Nobel Prize in
physics. At the time of Hubble’s death, the Committee hadn’t re-classified
work in astronomy. Suppose that on his deathbed Hubble said, ‘I predict
that the Committee will make work in astronomy eligible for the Nobel
Prize in physics.’ Hubble’s prediction isn’t falsified by the fact that he died
before learning that the Committee did re-classify astronomy. Rather, it
seems that his prediction is made true by the fact that the Committee re-
classified astronomy, regardless of whether Hubble lived to learn that fact.
 The hybrid iffy view
It might be thought that a hybrid of the iffy and modified iffy views can
handle all the cases. On this hybrid iffy view, predictions always have
future-directed contents, but not necessarily the same type of future-
directed content. When the event in question hasn’t yet happened (or
been completed), the prediction is about the future event directly. This
handles cases like Hubble’s deathbed prediction. But when the event has
already happened, the prediction is about the predictor’s future epistemic
state. This handles cases like the Big Bang theorist’s predictions about the
early universe, and the prediction about who won the game last night. We
would be happy if the hybrid iffy view enjoyed the benefits of each of the
earlier iffy views, but the drawbacks of neither.
But the hybrid iffy view runs afoul of intuitions about the following
kind of case.
(Forgetful Fans) You and I both know that Vancouver is sched-
uled to play Boston this week, but we’ve both forgotten
whether the game was to be played today (in two hours’ time,
say), or whether it in fact was played yesterday at that time.
(Neither of us has come into contact with any sports news in
the last few days.) Without settling the matter of what day

the game was actually scheduled for, you ask, ‘Any predictions
about the game?’ I respond, ‘My prediction: Vancouver wins.’
It seems clear that in Forgetful Fans, regardless of whether the game was
yesterday or is still to be played today, my prediction will be about the
same thing. It is a serious strike against a view if it can’t respect this
similarity desideratum, as we might call it. And the hybrid iffy view can’t
respect the similarity desideratum. If the game is in fact today in two
hours, the hybrid view rules that the prediction is genuinely about the
future game; by contrast, if the game was played yesterday, it rules that
the pre-diction is about what we will find out about who won the game.
We find this result unacceptable.
 Predictable expectations
Timothy Williamson () has argued influentially that assertion is indi-
viduated normatively, to wit, assertion is the unique speech act such that
knowledge is its unique constitutive norm. Williamson’s thesis has proved
useful as a basis for articulating norms of other assertive speech acts (e.g.
Kelp , Turri a). In light of this, one might try to individuate pre-
diction similarly, by identifying one or more norms unique to it. Given
that mere predictions have less assertoric force than flat-out assertions, it
stands to reason that prediction’s constitutive norm would be something
weaker than knowledge. Here we sketch an approach in this spirit.
A different way of preserving the core of the iffy view is to combine it with a kind of
speech act externalism (speech acts are ‘wide’): factors blankly external to the individual
can make an illocutionary difference. According to one way of developing this externalist
iffy account, you simply fail to make a prediction when you’re blind to the fact that the
event you’re speaking of isn’t in the future. Although we’re not opposed to speech act ex-
ternalism (see Davis  and Gauker ; but compare Harnish ), its application
in the present context seems ad hoc, and it doesn’t afford enough respect to the similarity
desideratum.

Predictions can plausibly be individuated on the broad spectrum of
assertives by appealing to the mental state which predictions seem to ex-
press, namely (mere) expectation. We don’t think this ordinary term needs
explication for the present proposal to be taken seriously, but here is a
sketch of the notion we have in mind: (mere) expectation is a mental state
of slight commitment, which requires regarding a proposition as more
likely than not, where this is a matter of having a higher credence in that
proposition than in its negation. One’s mere expectation that P will be
‘proper’ when one’s credences are apportioned to one’s evidence, namely
when one’s evidence makes P more likely than not-P. (Belief and knowl-
edge also entail commitment; but they go beyond slight commitment, so
they don’t involve mere expectation.) Roughly, the amount of commit-
ment required for expectation exceeds that of suspicion, but falls short of
outright belief. This might not uniquely pick out expectation, but it helps
narrow the field considerably. This also suggests that suspicion might set
the normative standard of conjecture, in the way that expectation does for
prediction.
Thus the view we want to put forth is the following:
(exp) One may predict that P if and only if one properly expects
that P.
We shall first consider the necessity direction, then the sufficiency direc-
tion.
On this view, the norm of predicting is the necessary condition: Pre-
dict that P only if one properly expects that P. Since fulfilling this condition
entails expecting P, a quick test for this norm is a cancelling conjunction:
Perhaps mere expectation falls significantly short of full expectation, and perhaps
full expectation suffices for outright belief; at the very least, this creates room for differ-
ences between mere prediction and fully confident prediction. This notion expectation
is somewhat akin to talk of credences in formal epistemology, but be-cause our main in-
terest is in how one can express such commitment, we have little to say about that here.

() I don’t expect that P, but still, I predict that P is/will be true.
() I predict that P, but I don’t expect that P.
If (exp) is true, then predicting P in the absence of expecting that P ought
to sound infelicitous because improper. Uttering () or () in the indicative
mood does not sound great to us, in that it opens one up to the retort: ‘Well
why are you predicting that P rather than not-P?’ But () and () don’t
exactly clash either: one could, it seems, expect neither that P nor that
not-P, and nevertheless still use the ‘I predict that’ construction to predict.
Such a prediction might still seem somewhat improper in the absence of
expectation; but for those who judge it to be perfectly acceptable, it would
be nice to have an explanation of why it can seem so.
That one might utter () or () acceptably can be explained if (exp) is
coupled with an account that distinguishes predictions from other speech
acts by what they earn you: one earns credit for predictions in a way that
one does not earn credit for guesses or conjectures. Likewise, one earns
more credit for successful use of speech-acts as one rises through the spec-
trum of assertives that are more forceful in their commitment: one earns
more credit (and puts more on the line) for successful hedged assertions
than for predictions, more for outright assertions than for hedged ones,
and more for guarantees than for outright assertions (cf. Turri , pp.
–). Because expecting, and predicting, ought to be based on evidence
or reasons for thinking that a proposition is (more likely than not to be)
true, one’s competence gets rewarded with a small amount of credit when
one expresses expectation through a true prediction. An account which
combines the normative and credit elements has the resources to say why
() and (), though somewhat acceptable, don’t sound great: ()’s first con-
junct, and ()’s second conjunct, effectively concede that one doesn’t have
the proper reasons favoring P. Because it discloses that the speaker doesn’t
really expect what is predicted, it lessens the credit she could have accrued

for a straight-up prediction; as such, the second conjunct seems effectively
downgraded to a mere guess. Because guesses sit so closely on the spec-
trum to predictions, they seem to pattern in similar ways; but the notion
of credit earned and extracted, and the corresponding reward for having
competently based one’s expectation on reasons, helps makes sense of the
difference between predictions and guesses.
Now for the sufficiency direction of (exp), which gives the condition for
being well-enough positioned for predicting: if one (appropriately) ex-
pects that P, then one is in a position to predict that P. Otherwise put: If
one properly expects that P, then one may predict that P. Given this, predic-
We don’t say that it no longer counts as a prediction, but rather that its prospects
have been eviscerated to the point where one has undermined the motivation for making
a prediction rather than a guess. Something similar may be happening in cases where
one claims to predict something which one does not regard as more likely than not: e.g.,
before the NCAA basketball tournament, in which + teams participate, one ‘predicts’
that a given team will win it all, even though one’s proper credence that they will win
is not more than .. In these special cases, no one possesses proper expectation of the
kind we outline above, and when it is understood by all involved that no one could have
that, what passes for proper expectation shifts to the alternative which seems more likely
than any other. In such contexts, it is unclear whether one is in fact still predicting rather
than guessing; indeed, as an anonymous referee points out, it may be partly a matter of
cultural convention whether, at such margins, one labels a speech act a mere guess or
instead a prediction (albeit one without reasonable expectation).
If one doubts that guesses differ from predictions in this way, compare the following
conjunctions:
() I have no idea, but I will/am going to go ahead and guess that P.
() I have no idea, but I will/am going to go ahead and predict that P.
() sounds a bit worse to us than (), and we suspect it is because one should have some
leaning or reason, however slight, on which to base a prediction, whereas guesses don’t
require even that.
One obvious difficulty here is closure: we expect lots of possibilities each of which
are individually more likely than not but which taken together are not more likely than
not (e.g. we will expect that the next throw of the -sided fair die won’t come up ;
but we expect that individually of each number on the die, even though we know that
some number must turn up). If (exp) is correct, won’t it sanction a speaker in predicting
multiple outcomes that are, taken together, not possible? We acknowledge this difficulty
but note that similar closure issues arise for assertion, evidence, justification, belief, and
knowledge (though different examples will apply). So (exp) faces no special problem

tion is the unique speech act such that its minimal sufficient permissibility
condition is the minimal sufficient permissibility condition for expecta-
tion.
The following observations provide some evidence for the proposed
equivalence of minimal sufficient permissibility conditions. We’re unwill-
ing to say that the standards of expectation and prediction come apart.
It strikes us as absurd to say, ‘That was not predictable, though it was
to be expected’, or, ‘That was to be expected, but it wasn’t predictable.’
Our unwillingness to allow the standards of expectation and prediction
to come apart is well explained by the fact that they don’t come apart—
they’re one and the same. Whenever something is predictable, it is also
reasonable to expect it; and whenever it is reasonable to expect something,
it is also predictable.
(exp)’s sufficiency condition also coheres well with the spectrum of
commitment for assertives: being positioned to engage in an assertive
speech act makes one also well-enough positioned (epistemically speak-
ing) to engage in each of the weaker speech-acts on the spectrum. Thus
(i) If one appropriately expects that P, then one is in a position
to predict that P and also in a position to guess that P.
And the other assertives can be similarly situated by other sufficiency
claims:
(ii) If one knows that P, then one is in a position to assert that
P, and to assert that one believes that P, and to predict
here.
These strike us as akin to other absurd claims relating speech acts to their normative
standards, such as the following about knowledge and assertion: ‘You could have known
that it was going to happen, but you were in no position to say whether it would happen’,
‘She knows whether it’s true, but she is in no position to say whether it’s true.’

that P, and to guess that P.
(iii) If one knows that one knows P, then one is in a position
to guarantee that P, and to assert that P, and to assert that
one believes that P, and to predict that P, and to guess that
P.
Clearly, the sufficiency claims (i)–(iii) go beyond what (exp) itself is com-
mitted to; but they unify the assertive speech-acts on the scale of commit-
ment, while helping to show how they are individuated. Most relevant for
our purposes, (i) reveals how close guesses are to predictions (which gives
a clue to why they can seem to pattern together). But (i) also permits an
asymmetry between them: being in a position to guess doesn’t necessarily
suffice for being in a position to predict. Otherwise put, guessing requires
no evidence or credence, and earns no credit; predicting requires some ev-
idence and expectation, earns partial credit, and implies being positioned
to guess; asserting requires knowledgeable belief, earns full credit, and im-
plies being positioned to predict; and guaranteeing requires knowing that
one knows, earns full credit plus bonus marks, and implies being posi-
tioned to assert.
One virtue of (exp), and the sufficiency claims (i)–(iii) above, is that
they well explain the overlap between asserting and predicting: on the
one hand, one can predict by way of asserting precisely because assert-
ing also commits one to proper expectation; but on the other hand, (exp)
delineates what constitutes the speech-act of mere prediction, and how
one could engage in prediction, and properly so, without outright assert-
ing. Furthermore, the (exp) account allows one to forego building into the
speech-act of prediction a stricter norm according to which one should
predict that P only if one does not know that P. Including such a norm is
Though see Brown  and Lackey  for possible reasons to doubt this suffi-
ciency thesis.

tempting because (mere) predictions tend, and are typically expected by
hearers, to be made by speakers without knowledge of what is predicted.
But the sufficiency condition of (exp) provides the resources for explain-
ing how it is that speakers typically do not know when issuing predictions:
given (i)–(iii), not knowing is a pragmatic fact about the conditions under
which we typically opt to predict because, when one merely expects that P,
prediction is the strongest speech-act to which one can commit given one’s
(perceived) epistemic position. And it is plausible to suppose that there
is a speech-act equivalent to the ‘Assert the Stronger’ rule, on which: if
you’re going to perform an assertive speech-act, you should perform the
strongest assertive that your evidence permits (and no stronger). Such a
rule would explain, first, why hearers can typically expect that someone
who opts to predict (rather than assert, or guarantee) doesn’t know what
is predicted, and second, why it would seem objectionable for one to use a
weaker speech act such as predicting (or conjecturing, or guessing) when
one clearly knows. (Note that such a rule isn’t specific to prediction, so it
cannot be used to individuate prediction.)
 Conclusion
The standard view is that the speech act of prediction is individuated by
future-directed content. Given the serious problems we have identified for
it, the standard view seems unsustainable, in both its original and mod-
ified forms. A much more promising approach individuates assertion in
terms of either the mental state it expresses or its distinctive evidential
On which see DeRose , pp. –.
There may be further fruitful ways of distinguishing prediction. It may be plausible
to distinguish prediction from other weak assertives such as guesses or conjectures by
the way it relates to other aspects of discourse, similar to how ‘I reply that P’ differs
from ‘I object that P’. Prediction may also be distinguishable stylistically, similar to how
announcing that P differs from confessing that P. We do not take up such highly nuanced
approaches here.

norms. We have defended the view that the mental state of expectation,
and the evidential norms associated with it, is well suited to fill this role.
We hope, and expect, that this is a very promising first step toward a fully
adequate account of prediction.
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